

[800]
the real
s for the
y minis-
s worth
"reval."
y plain,
g, just
acid in-
ector to
ore the
here is
em be
ains in
rty, or
ate the
proved
an "a

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. IV. No. 23.] London, Saturday, 10th December, 1803. [Price 10d

"I know, Sir, there have been periods, when there were persons in the country, who would have overturned its most excellent constitution; but, thank God, these times are past. And I do believe, that, through the whole of this kingdom, there never was a minute, when the people were more satisfied with their Government, or more unanimous in their determination to support and defend it; and it is with some degree of pride, I can say that the chief cause of this happy effect is the much reprobated treaty of peace. Before that, there had for some time prevailed an opinion, that the war might have been sooner terminated; but now, though it is so soon renewed, every one is sensible of its injustice on the part of the enemy, and the whole people are ready to join, heart and hand, in the defence of their King and Country, and, if necessary, to die in that cause. I know, Sir, it was necessary for the security of the kingdom, to continue, for some time, the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, and some others; but I know that to the peace we owe the restoration of those valuable bulwarks of the constitution, and they are not among the least of its blessings." — *Mr. Addington's Speech, July 18, 1803.*

601]

602

AFFAIRS OF IRELAND.

LETTER IV.

Dublin, Nov. 28, 1803.

SIR,—In my second letter I stated to you the conduct of the government of Ireland at the time the rebellion broke out. In my third I endeavoured to ascertain of what materials that government was composed, and to inquire by what acts the sublime personages who are now become our rulers acquired their right to the description bestowed on them by the Doctor of being "truly great characters." But, perhaps, in adverting to that "truly great character," the late chancery pleader, I did not do justice to the Doctor. Great and little are certainly relative terms. And, although by the standard of public opinion, or of public service, the true greatness of the late chancery pleader may not appear, yet, whenever an intellectual microscope shall be formed of such magnifying power as to enable us to discover the real extent of the Doctor's own capacity, it may be found that, in a relative sense, between the applauder and the applauded, the description of a *truly great character* given to the latter, may not have been misapplied. I have traced these *truly great characters* through the night of terror; the one not having come forward at all, and the other having made good his retreat. I have, however, made one small omission with respect to Lord Hardwicke. It is a certain fact, that upon having been directed so to do by Mr. Marsden, his excellency did come to Dublin on the day of the rebellion, at two o'clock, and that he never attempted to retreat until about five o'clock in the evening, when it was the opinion of Mr. Marsden that his excellency should retreat, lest an alarm should be excited through the kingdom by his excellency's remaining in town

*to dine at the Castle.** And here ends the military career of Mr. Marsden and his excellency. Of the tendency of their civil conduct, afterwards, a few facts will be worth your observation. Mr. Marsden, in his first fright on the night of the 23d of July, had sent off dispatches to London. Of the contents of these dispatches we are ignorant; but we may infer something of their essence from their substantial effects. The British ministry must have acted under the information of these dispatches. Accordingly, bills for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, and for the establishment of martial law for Ireland, passed through the Houses of Parliament in one night. Lord Hawkesbury, in his reply on that night to Mr. Windham, used this remarkable expression. "A rebellion has broke out in Ireland more enormous than ever occurred before." In Ireland, Sir, the City of Dublin was turned into the state of a blockaded town. Syracuse from Marcellus, and Saguntum from Hannibal were not more anxiously watched. Regular troops, yeomanry, general officers, and great guns; attorneys-general and block houses were all in commotion. Centripetal and centrifugal forces in equal motion, and in equality of counter-action to each other. Arms, from that precipitate revulsion of terror which marks the ague-fit of the mind, were indiscriminately put into any hands where tongues could be found to ask for them. To put down this most "enormous rebellion," a body of yeomanry were placed on permanent pay and duty, to the amount, in point of expense, of above £100,000 per month. That this body of yeomanry was called out in aid of the regular force, merely for the

* See page 49, of Mr. Marsden's Pamphlet, entitled, *An Impartial Observer.*

purpose of meeting the rebellion, is evident from the following circumstance: that at this moment, while I am writing, although it is the very period at which the landing of a foreign enemy may most probably be expected, this body of yeomanry are, almost entirely, to be put off permanent duty, and to have their pay withdrawn. And, now, Sir, if you were to inquire at the Castle of Dublin, what had been the occasion of all this clatter of preparation, both civil and military, you would be told, "indeed there had been a *dispute* in Thomas Street in the night of the 23d of July." Nay, Sir, I will venture to assert, that if any person were now to go to the waiting-room of Mr. Marsden, and were to presume to call the bloody transaction of the 23d of July, by any other name than "a *dispute* in Thomas Street," there is not a follower of Mr. Marsden, even to my Lord Lieutenant, who would not consider him as having talked very indecently. Great men are often known by little things, and there is one circumstance which is scarcely worth notice, but as a trait of character. On the 1st of August, the bills which had been brought into Parliament on the 28th of July arrived in Ireland. By that day our "truly great characters" had, in some degree, recovered that portion of understanding with which it has been pleased God to endow them. By that day they began to perceive the difficulty under which their conduct had brought them. Did a *rebellion* break out? Had it been eight months in preparation? Had arms and ammunition for 20,000 men been deposited within half a mile of the Castle of Dublin? If so, were the government prepared? And if not, what had they been doing? And if they were prepared, why (to use the phrase of Mr. Whiteford's cross reading of the newspapers), did the Lord Lieutenant like those who presented the petition at St. James's, which grizzed fire, "make off?" These were questions which then began to ferment in the understandings of these *truly great characters*; and they deemed it wise, in order to soften as far as possible the inevitable and cruel answers to such interrogatories, to withdraw the fact of *rebellion*, as far as possible, from the public eye. For this purpose, the skill of that *truly great character*, the Doctor's lawyer, and of Mr. Marsden's attorney-general was resorted to. And accordingly, in the phrases of the proclamations, which were issued from the Privy Council on the 1st of August, we can perceive a running struggle of duplicity which, and a ridiculous combination of fear with folly. *Well* defined and legal

simple term of rebellion is every where avoided; and the act is, in one line, denominated a sort of a rebellious insurrection; in another, an outrage; in another, a conspiracy; in another, a murder. And now, by the lapse of time, the tattle of court runners, and the unqualified and contradictory assertions of Mr. Marsden's attorney-general on the trials for high treason, this *rebellion*, said, by my Lord Hawkesbury, to be "more enormous than ever occurred before," has gradually sunk into a *dispute* in Thomas Street. But it were well if these exertions of little cunning reached no further. What I have stated of them, will serve only to excite contempt among the grave, and mirth among the jesting part of mankind. What I have now to touch upon must be done with a delicate hand. I will confine myself to a bare narrative of facts, and will not presume to give any opinion. As soon as the government had fully recovered its recollection, a commission directed to five of the judges, issued for the trial of those rebels who had been arrested for treason committed in the county and city of Dublin. This commission, having issued while the judges were on circuit, was filled up (and very properly filled up) with the names of the five *senior* of those judges who were then on the circuits, which were likely to terminate at the earliest period of time. Such was the reason given by government for the particular selection of the judges named in that commission, and it certainly was a good reason. In some time after this commission had been sitting, it became necessary to issue a new commission for the trial of rebels in the shires of Antrim and of Down. In the appointment of this second commission, the principle which directed the selection in the first was not adhered to. On the contrary, the *junior* judge of the twelve was very anxiously culled out, and placed in this new commission, over the heads of a number of his seniors. This, however, could not, and ought not to have given offence to any of those senior judges, because, whatever opinion of them the government may have manifested in such an appointment, the opinion of the present government upon such a subject (known to be influenced by motives very different from general justice) is too contemptible to have the slightest effect upon any of those learned judges, in the public mind. The circumstance, therefore, was not at first attended to. There is published in this city a newspaper called the *Dublin Journal*. It is, in general, conducted with good sense, loyalty, and a regard to truth;

but, in be und 20th o which the ju grand this p far fro ed jud and w you w paper made " the " tio " me " late " fec tice d am fa ment such a the f know the f gentle and a would though awe a langu when meet who allud willin to th that his h wher force on th ment hales ing war ener the rema tery ener be e then to thei lea adm exi

but, in particular deviations, it is known to be under the control and immediate direction of government. In that paper of the 20th of October last, a publication appeared, which purported to be a charge given by the *junior* judge above alluded to, to the grand jury of the county of Antrim. In this place I beg now to declare, that I am far from attempting to assert, that the learned judge did pronounce any such charge; and when I speak of his charge, I request you will understand I mean only the newspaper publication above-mentioned. In the newspaper publication the learned judge is made to tell the grand jury, that "through 'the well-timed efforts and strenuous exertions of a wise and energetic government, &c. the progress of such crimes as lately disgraced this country had been effectually checked." If the learned justice did make any such assertion, (which I am far from supposing) with what amazement the grand jury must have received such a broadside, poured upon the truth of the fact, I cannot, as I was not present, know; but I can very well imagine what the feelings of twenty-three well informed gentlemen must have been. Their respect, and a thorough knowledge of their duty would necessarily keep them silent. But though men remain silent under the proper awe and control of a court of justice, their language only becomes more strenuous when that restraint is taken off, and they meet together in private confidence. They who have read the paper to which I have alluded, do not scruple to say, that they are willing to assent to the language attributed to the learned justice, if it shall be admitted that the picture of Mr. Marsden wringing his hands and calling upon God to help him, when Captain King, of the Lawyers' Corps, forced his way into Mr. Marsden's presence on the night of the 23d of July, be a proof of the wisdom and the energy of government. If poor Sir Edward Baker Littlehales having fallen into hystericks upon seeing the unfortunate daughter of Lord Kilwarden be a proof of the wisdom and the energy of the government. If the *retreat* of the Lord Lieutenant to the Park, there to remain within cover of the guns of the battery, be a proof of the wisdom and the energy of the government. If all these facts be evidence of that *wisdom* and that *energy*, then they say they will be willing to assent to the assertion, which the government, in their newspaper have attributed to the learned justice. They say, if it should be admitted that a conspiracy and plot having existed in various parts of the kingdom since

the time at which the charge of the learned justice is supposed to have been pronounced: if committees in actual debate (partly composed of the King's militia) having been *since* taken up by the yeomanry, and the prisons filled with them, be proof that an "effectual check" had been, *before*, put to the crime of rebellion, then they say they will assent to the charge attributed to the learned justice. But, Sir, suggestion does not stop here. Men ask, how could (if the learned justice did make any such assertion) the learned justice be led to give credit to a position which contradicts the evidence of the senses of every man in the kingdom, who was present at, or knew any thing of the transaction? How could a learned judge be supposed to assert that, which no man in the kingdom would assert, unless he had some reasons of the same nature as those which prevailed on Mr. Marsden's attorney-general, on the trials for high treason, to assert something of the same kind? Men, Sir, couple the *extraordinary selection* of the learned justice from amongst his fellows, with the *extraordinary assertion* attributed to him in a government newspaper, and they ask, if he made that assertion, where did he get his information? Was he ever in Mr. Marsden's audience-room since the night of the 23d of July? What *passed* there? What were the pre-disposing causes which induced government to *select particularly* that learned justice? Could government have *foreseen* (and if so, by what faculty) that the learned justice would have given an instruction to the grand jury, so very useful and so very grateful to the government? What night telescope could have been applied to the eye of Mr. Marsden, which, through the dark womb of things unborn, could have enabled him to perceive through this little future star of praise, springing from the creative lips of the learned justice? Here, Sir, decorum towards you and towards the Public induces me to be silent as to other, and perhaps stronger observations. But I may, I believe, add what men also say, that if it were possible the ermine robe of the most awful attribute of his Majesty should have been wrapped round the acts of Mr. Marsden, in order to screen them from public disgrace, we might then look for another, but not less fatal end to our liberties and to our constitution than that which rebellion or invasion could produce. And in truth, they say, that except as to momentary effects, rebellion and invasion might be viewed with indifference, if it can be supposed, that the stained hands of a petty clerk had been washed in the

very fountain of justice. — I am compelled here by the duty of civility and respect, to turn aside from the general course of my subject, in order to take notice of a letter signed *Cambricus*, which appeared in your paper of the 12th instant. *Cambricus* has done me the honour to advert to a sentence in a former letter of mine, in which the name of Lord Kenyon was mentioned. I am not surprised at *Cambricus* having been offended, when he found his countryman introduced into such company. I am ready to confess, that when I placed the name of Lord Kenyon in that sentence, I ought to have added some observations to it which I am now very sorry were omitted: and, though I know my letters were written for a good public purpose, and though I think they have not been without some effect, yet I do assure *Cambricus*, I would almost wish they never had been published, rather than one line of them should have given offence to any honest gentleman of Wales. But, I am ready to confess my fault and to make atonement; and when I say so much, if *Cambricus* be a genuine son of St. David, I am certain of his forgiveness. I not only agree with *Cambricus* in every part of the character which he has given of Lord Kenyon, but I will go a little further, and I will do so publicly, that in this instance *Cambricus* may cease to compare me with the author of the *Pursuits of Literature*, who, by the account of *Cambricus*, corrected in private only, the misrepresentation he had uttered in public. Lord Kenyon was a man of eminent knowledge as a lawyer. He was, besides, a man of remarkable purity and singleness of heart; and I make no doubt of his having now fully experienced the truth of that consoling sentence of Hooker "It is not the deepness of their knowledge but the singleness of their belief which God accepteth." But to these high acquirements, and to these virtuous natural dispositions, Lord Kenyon added one singular branch of knowledge, which is, perhaps, more rarely possessed than any other. Lord Kenyon knew, or at least acted as if he knew, the precise bounds and limits of his own powers and his own attainments. Cardinal Richelieu was a very great statesman: he wished to be thought a very great poet; and he made very bad verses. Lord Kenyon was neither a wit nor a statesman: but he knew himself, and, so he never became either mischievous or ridiculous. Whether this conduct in my Lord Kenyon proceeded from an innate modesty of nature, or from a penetrating logical faculty, turning in

upon and viewing itself. (its hardest exercise) I cannot; nor is it necessary for me to determine. Instead of calling him to the high station which he so ably filled, had it pleased his Majesty to bless the western neighbours of *Cambricus* (who certainly owe the honest and warm-hearted principality no ill will) with Lord Kenyon for their Chancellor; I can very well conceive what Lord Kenyon, in such a situation, would have done, and also, what he would not have done. From a rare modesty of nature, or from a rare precision of self-knowledge, Lord Kenyon would have acted with reserve and circumspection, on his arrival in a country, with the moral qualities of the inhabitants of which, and with their persons, manners, and individual characters and connexions, he must have been utterly unacquainted. In such a country, torn with domestic sedition and treason, threatened with foreign invasion, and acting, since the union, under an untried constitution, if Doctor Addington had required that Lord Kenyon should direct a Cambridgeshire Earl "in ALL his councils," Lord Kenyon would as soon, at the desire of Lord St. Vincent's, have undertaken to pilot a line of battle ship through the Needles. Particularly, the integrity of Lord Kenyon would have shrunk from such an undertaking, if a condition had been added to it that no one nobleman or gentleman who possessed any rank, estate, or connexion in the country, should upon any account be consulted. His pride would have spurned at the undertaking, if he were told, that to the Cambridgeshire Earl and himself, in the cares of government, a clerk in the secretary's office, and a couple of lawyers without political habits, political information or honourable connexion, were to be joined as assessors, and to be the only assessors. And Lord Kenyon's pride and integrity would have both joined in preventing him from being, himself, the instrument of introducing such men into a cabinet of government. If any one man could be found, of whom a young but unhappy victim of the justly offended laws of his country, had, in the moment of his conviction and sentence, uttered the following apostrophe—" That viper! whom my father nourished! He it was from whose lips I first imbibed those principles and doctrines, which now by their effects drag me to my grave; and he it is who is now brought forward as my prosecutor, and who by an unheard of exercise of the prerogative, has wantonly lashed, with a speech to evidence, the dying son

“ of his former friend, when that dying son “ had produced no evidence, had made no “ defence, but, on the contrary, had ac- “ knowledged the charge, and had submit- “ ted to his fate.” — Lord Kenyon would have turned with horror from such a scene, in which, although guilt was in one part to be punished, yet in the whole drama, justice was confounded, humanity outraged, and loyalty insulted. Of Lord Kenyon, therefore, (Cambricus must well know) it never could have been believed, that he himself would lead such a character forward, introduce him to the favour of a deceived Sovereign, clothe him in the robes, and load him with the emoluments of office. Lord Kenyon must have known that a noble Duke for having toasted at a drunken club, in a common tavern, to a noisy rabble, “ *the sovereignty of the people*, ” was struck, by his Majesty’s command, out of the privy council, and deprived of all his offices both civil and military. If therefore, any man were to be found, who, not at a drunken club, or to a brawling rabble, but in a grave and high assembly; not in the character of an inebriated toast-master, but in that of a sober constitutional lawyer, had insisted on *the sovereignty of the people* as a first principle of the English law; and had declared, that by law an appeal lay from the decision of the tellers of the Houses of Parliament, to that of the “ *tellers of the nation*; ” and, that if a particular law were disagreeable to the people, however it might have been enacted with all royal and parliamentary solemnity, nevertheless, “ it was not binding, and the people by the general law were exempted from obedience to such a particular law, because the people were the supreme and ultimate judges of what was for their own benefit.” — Lord Kenyon, if he had been Chancellor in any kingdom in Europe, would have shrunk from recommending any such man to the favour of a Monarch, while there yet remained a shadow of monarchy visible in the world. If Lord Kenyon had been Chancellor, he would have applied himself to his particular duty with exemplary diligence. He would, probably, have sat in his court for five hours in each day. But, if he did, vanity (for poor Lord Kenyon had not any vanity) would never have defeated his labour by inducing him to waste two hours and a half out of each five, in law lectures upon general topics to excite the wonder of the junior lawyers at the extent of his learning, and to turn a grave court of judgment into a theatre for didactic exercise. Lord Kenyon would have known that his

duty, there, was precise and particular decision, and not diffuse and elementary discussion. Lord Kenyon, knowing his duty, had no one sorry passion which could lead him from the execution of it; and, therefore, by the delay of gratifying any such sorry passion no arrear of causes could have been accumulated in his court, which would have starved the bar, and harassed the suitor. It was said of Lord Kenyon that he loved money. If so, he loved his own money only, and not the money of any other man. Lord Kenyon therefore, as Chancellor, never would have made any rule or order by the effects of which, the secretary of a Master of the Rolls would be deprived of all fees, for the purpose of throwing all those fees into the hands of the secretary to the Chancellor, the better to enable that secretary to discharge the pension of some unknown attendant on his official profits. The mild spirit of Lord Kenyon would have remembered, that in this age of toleration every man’s conscience was his own while he obeyed the laws. Lord Kenyon, therefore, never would have fixed upon a nobleman of ancient blood, and of a loyal and a gallant spirit to insult and rate in tedious letters on points of controversial doctrine. Innocent as Lord Kenyon was, he would not have displayed his ignorance of the world by attacking his superiors with his knowledge of the Council of Constance. Lord Kenyon would not have made his labours ridiculous, and his rank contemptible by any such silly interference. Cambricus has observed, that Lord Kenyon was apt to indulge himself in a super-abundance of quotations from the Classics. From having indulged myself a little in the same sort of exercise, it is not probable that I should have censured such a practice in his lordship. If Lord Kenyon had been tempted by such a man as Doctor Addington to play the politician, the classical recollections of his lordship might have been of some use to him. He might have remembered many observations, which would have shewed him the vast differences between the mind of a statesman and the cases of a lawyer. Of Cicero’s opinion of the lawyers he would have recollecte— *Primum aignitas in tan^{te} tenui scientia qu^{re} potest esse? res enim sunt parae, prope in singulis literis, atque inter punctuationibus verbis non occupatae.* — And again. *At aiunt in Graecis artificibus eo auctoritas esse qui eithat^{et} di fieri non potuerint; sic nonnullos videmus qui oratres evadere non potuerunt eos ad iuris studium ducere. Even old Naevius cannot abstain from them. Cedo qui vestram rem publicam tantam amistis, tam cito?* — *Pro-*

veniebant Oratores novi, Sulti, Adolescentuli, Causidici. If Lord Kenyon had extended his reading to modern classics he would have found in his own language, and of his own time, the opinion with respect to lawyers, of a man whose theorems of political science time is, every day, demonstrating by the awful diagram of events.—Of the lawyers, Mr. Burke says, “It cannot have “escaped observation, that when men are “too much confined to professional and “faculty habits, and, as it were, inveterate “in the recurrent employment of that nar-“row circle, they are rather disabled than “qualified for whatever depends on the “knowledge of mankind, on experience “in mixed affairs, on a comprehensive con-“nected view of the various complicated “and external interests which go to the “formation of that multifarious thing called “a state.” If therefore, Lord Kenyon’s consciousness had not checked him in his political undertakings, his favourite authorities (a string of authorities his friend Serjeant Hill would have called them, reaching from the first punic war to the first regicide war) would have stopped his career. But, if Lord Kenyon could not have been stopped from intermeddling in political affairs, either by the check of internal consciousness, or by the weight of external authority, still however, although he might not have been induced with that sagacity, which would have empowered him previously, and at a distance, to see what was right, yet he possessed that native honesty which would have enabled him, near at hand, to feel what was wrong.—Lord Kenyon, therefore, never would have submitted to make part of a government where, while the Prince of his beloved Wales, considering the pressure of the times, generously withdrew his just demands on the public purse, and retired from the rightful dignity of his state to the shade of private life, the revenues of a kingdom of his father were wasted in puerile amusements to gratify the inane mind of a subject, whose vacancies of contemplation must be filled, sometimes by a new house and sometimes by a new garter. Lord Kenyon, though not a soldier, had common sense enough to perceive that there must be either folly or falsehood, or both, in calling out, in aid of a regular army, a body of yeomanry at the expense of one hundred and sixty thousand pounds per month, for the purpose of putting down a *dispute in Thessaloniki*. Lord Kenyon never would have submitted to have been responsible as a cabinet minister, for a measure either of *foolishness* or of *absurdity*. The professional

pride and the inborn honour of Lord Kenyon, would never have suffered him to enter into a combination to sap, by underhand means, the independence of his brethren the judges. He never would have suffered the great seal in his hands to be used for the purpose of garbling the bench, in order to gratify those who might be contented publicly to eulogize that government, which privately they must have despised. Nor would he have employed any of his leisure in searching into offices for practices, by which he might harass the domestic arrangements of others, whose pride and whose integrity would not bend to his views; and thus double the vigour of his attack by practising on the hopes of some, and endeavouring to work upon the fears of others. I fear, Sir, I must have trespassed on your patience in endeavouring to atone for my fault, and to pacify the just resentment of Cambricus, by stating what conduct my Lord Kenyon, upon a fair computation of his character, would have pursued, and what conduct he would have avoided. If the anger of Cambricus should not yet be appeased, I beg, Sir, you will assure him of my readiness still to go on, and to gratify him to the utmost extent of his desires.—

I am, Sir, yours, JUVERNA.

LETTER III.

FROM A CONTINENTAL OBSERVER.

Hamburg, Nov. 4, 1803.

SIR,—In my former letters, I examined the two first questions which I had proposed; and concluded by deciding both in the affirmative. I unfolded to you, generally, the reasons which induced me to think: 1st, that if the proposition of your correspondent, Inquisitor, for re-establishing the French monarchy in the person of Louis XVIII. were successful, it would be essentially advantageous to Great Britain: (a thing, indeed, which appears so certain that I am almost ashamed of having doubted it) and 2dly, that such a measure is feasible; not that it is infallible, and still less that it is hazardous, but that if it be well conducted, it must be successful. I will now proceed to inquire, whether, if it be both desirable and practicable, there is any reason to suppose that Great Britain will attempt it?—In the first place, has England a right to interfere, with this view, in the internal affairs of France? Before the peace of Amiens, she most undoubtedly had, although she had never directly exercised it. But at that peace, by giving her formal sanction to the new consular authority, she, formally, gave up all right of opposing it.

The nature of the present war, however, and the nature of the hostilities with which, both the government and the people of Great-Britain are threatened, have, unquestionably, restored every tittle of the right which she surrendered at the peace of Amiens. Besides, it is universally acknowledged, that the right which one nation has of interfering in the internal affairs of another, though generally contrary to reason and equity, is perfectly justifiable, when founded on the sacred duty of self-preservation.—The general character of the English appears to me to be diametrically opposite to the versatility of the French. Equally attached to their prejudices and their manners, the English are, taking every thing into consideration, less altered than any other people in Europe. They travel more than all others; and yet they return to settle themselves down again in their island, and are, at the day of their death, as completely English, as when they left the university. One of the characteristic traits of their mode of thinking, is, that France is at all times, and in every respect, the opposite scale of the balance. An Englishman carries his rivalry in his blood, while a Frenchman only feels it on temporary occasions, and in casual fits. To reconcile Englishmen to the design of promoting the welfare of France, it will, therefore, be necessary to change the natural and long established notions of the majority of the people; a task, which I confess, appears, at first, to be almost hopeless. Let me not be supposed, however, to regard Englishmen as a race of intractable beings. The excess of that natural rivalry which must exist between two opposite powers, is more moderate, in proportion as they are equally powerful. The English are, perhaps, better acquainted with their own interest than any other people, but they are also more reasonable and more just; and, generally, are not insensible to sentiments of generosity and humanity.—If this be the case, why should not a true Englishman, who is made up of patriotism, at once, lay aside all his haughty jealousy and adopt the most certain, the most expeditious, and the most honourable means of saving his country. I repeat it, of saving his country; for while France is subject to any revolutionary system whatever, she will be the source of constant disturbance, and even of constant terror to all the rest of Europe; and the dangers which now threaten that quarter of the world, will be followed by a never-ending train of others more terrible. England is connected with the Continent

by ties so essential, so numerous, and so various, that she may always be annoyed by it, without any direct attack. Her power or her commerce is constantly affected by the propitious or adverse events, which are perpetually and rapidly occurring there; and this political sensibility authorises the pretensions which she naturally makes to influence the affairs of the Continent, and the discontent which she feels when any attempt is made to exclude her. If we investigate the subject closely, we shall perceive that it is not France which England is called upon to defend. It is the revolution which is to be dreaded; and France is its potent instrument, an instrument which we cannot break, but which we may tear from the malignant hand that wields it. In his fourth letter, your correspondent has very justly defined the distinction which exists between the former rivalry, and the present animosity of the two countries. But if the revolution be once deprived of the support of France, its power will begin to decay; other nations that wish to escape its influence will unite against it, and England will not be the only power to rejoice in its defeat.—The first object in the eyes of all Englishmen is undoubtedly, and indeed very justly, the welfare of his country. In this case the welfare of his country is inseparable from the maintenance of Christianity, and the happiness of society, not only in England, but in every other part of the civilized world. What noble motives for men of honourable souls; and what a splendid object for a nation emulous of true glory! At the very moment when France is leaguing the whole Continent against England; when she has shut her out from the commerce of Europe, and has threatened to carry fire and sword into the very heart of her territories; England, rising superior to her menaces, undertakes to reanimate and encourage terrified and degraded Europe; and, having delivered her rival from chains, compels her to become her friend! Such vengeance would be, at once, the wisest policy and the greatest benefit. The maritime and commercial part of Europe is compelled to submit to, and to bless the sway which England exercises over the seas. Such are the consequences of a plan which every thing calls for, and which nothing can compensate. Let not Inquisitor call it his plan. It was dictated by the genius of England; it belongs to every enlightened, sensible, and generous Englishman; to the ministry as well as to the opposition; to the city as well as to the country; and to the

merchants as well as to the army and the fleet. If I were an Englishman I would avow and pursue it; and if I were a Frenchman, I would, for the rest of my life, be the friend of England, whom I ever regard as my benefactress and my deliverer. These being my sentiments and my feelings, I do not hesitate to avow, that there is every probability that England will adopt a measure, in which success is so certain, and advantage so apparent.—Let us now proceed to the fourth subject of inquiry, which is: whether there is any appearance that the powers of the Continent will aid or oppose such a plan?—If the French monarchy is to be restored, it is not by the powers of the Continent that the restoration will be effected. I do not mean to speak here of their intentions; but I do not scruple to say, that, in that respect, they are not what they ought to be. Such is my opinion; but the facts and the reasonings upon which that opinion is founded, I hope you will excuse me for not detailing. France will always, and in every case, suspect the honourableness of their views, and the sincerity of their co-operation. As Great-Britain offers no other real source of jealousy for France, than her naval superiority, she would, I think, if she were to propose a plan, inspire both France and the powers of the Continent, with more confidence: but, what would contribute more especially to that confidence, would be, the publicity of her discussions and resolutions; which would effectually remove all doubt and distrust relative to the reality and honesty of her design, as well as of the engagements she would make in the face of Europe. Her situation, the nature of her power, the nature of her government, her wealth, her credit, and the extent of her connexions qualify her, better than any other power, for becoming the grand mover and director, at a crisis so important. On the Continent, however, she possesses only an indirect influence; and, therefore, France will, as I before hinted, be the only direct instrument in effecting her own deliverance. In my opinion, when the attempt is to be made, the force of events will render it necessary that it should be so. But if it were possible that the restoration should be completed without the interference of any foreign soldier, on the territories of France, it would, most assuredly be better; and, in that case, the war between France and England would vanish into air.—But although an active and armed coalition of the powers of the Continent be not thought desirable; although that complicated and unwieldy ma-

chine, whose perpetual jarrings always thwart its object, be not deemed necessary; it does not follow that the acquiescence, the countenance, the favour, the support, and even the aid of those powers, are not objects of the greatest importance. If they should oppose it, either openly or secretly, they will increase the obstacles to its execution, and, perhaps, prevent its accomplishment; but if, on the contrary, they should be favourable, how numerous and how great will be the means which every one of them can bring to its support! England will, then, have to combine these various means, and to direct the operation of the whole: a plan of proceeding, more troublesome, perhaps, but, certainly, infinitely more effectual, than the jarring and incongruous efforts of an unwieldy coalition. And if, under such circumstances, any one of those powers should happen to abandon her, her plan need not be interrupted; for the aid which she receives from the others will not be at all lessened. Things which it is the business of every one to do, are generally neglected; but if done at all, are always ill done. If they require any trouble or any difficulty, each leaves them for another, and if there be any errors, each blames his neighbour. There is neither unity of design, nor co-operation of measures; but each pursues his own course to accomplish his own object.—Let us now endeavour to discover what part it is likely that the powers of the Continent will adopt relative to this grand measure. There are three courses for them to take: to remain neuter; to declare in favour of England; and, to declare against her.—As for their neutrality, which is so generally delusive, and, indeed, so frequently hostile, it would, in this case, be less to be relied upon than ever. In fact, it is impossible to suppose it could exist for any length of time. They would all have so deep an interest in an affair of such great moment, that they could not remain inactive spectators of the scene. Each would, perhaps, endeavour, at first, to assume the mask of neutrality, but necessity would soon compel her to lay it aside.—What would, then, be the consequences; and what would be the part which they would take? Is there a single person in England, or, indeed, any where else, who supposes that any government in Europe, either great or small, is really attached to the present government of France? Most assuredly there is not one. Although it is universally feared and universally flattered, it is not less universally hated. States in alliance with her,

states at peace with her, neutral states, dependent states, affiliated states, conquered states, and indemnified and indemnifying states, all, all entertain but one opinion and but one feeling concerning republican France; and what that opinion and that feeling are, no person need to be told. The jealousy which existed towards ancient France terminated with the monarchy, and even the remembrance of it has been obliterated by the more powerful sentiments which the conduct of modern France has produced. The secret wishes of the cabinets and of the hearts of every king on the Continent will, therefore, be for the restoration of the monarchy: but I fear that the mean and sneaking policy of the age will not be much disposed, openly and frankly, to aid it. Every step, however, which it takes in its career, will increase its vigour; and the strongest power will, naturally, be the first to decide on the conduct which it may be necessary for her to pursue. All will be interested in its success; and those whom particular circumstances may have determined to remain neutral, and even those who may be compelled to espouse the cause of the French government, will be constantly hoping for the time when they may become the declared friends of the monarchy. But the moment that Europe sees the least prospect of the success of the enterprise, the universal wish will be in its favour; and it will then be ambition of all to contribute zealously and effectually to its promotion. There is, however, one difficulty which, in my opinion, will not be very easily removed; and which, in the cabinets of some of those powers, will be a great obstacle in the way of their good wishes. If the congress, proposed by your correspondent, should be formed, it ought to adjust, not only the affairs of France, but those of Europe. Its great object will be to restore order, to re-establish the balance of power, and to secure the rights of each state. It will, undoubtedly, be difficult to fix the standard by which France is to indemnify the various states which she has injured, and to restore to each an equivalent for the losses which it may have sustained. This is the only consideration which makes me hesitate in the opinion, which I should otherwise have formed, of the favourable disposition of the powers of the Continent: and this it is which makes me dubious of the answer which should be given to the fourth question.—I have now gone through the subjects which I proposed to investigate; and the result is, in answer to the first question, that it is un-

deniable; to the second, that it is apparent; to the third, that it is probable; and to the fourth, that it is doubtful.—I am, &c. &c. &c.

ON THE CAVALRY.

SIR,—Amidst the farcical exhibitions of military pantomime, which the corps of volunteers are now performing before the public, under the management of his Majesty's servants, has it ever been considered to what lengths of dangerous absurdity this ludicrous mania may carry the nation; to what desperate extremes this frenetic infatuation may lead the country?—Yet every hireling and unprincipled newspaper daily teems with the most fulsome and disgusting panegyric on the appearance, discipline, and martial ardour which pervades these heroic defenders of the country.—Every day we are amused with elaborate narrations of brilliant operations performed by one or other of these distinguished corps, which, dividing themselves, or opposed to some others of equal celebrity, representing an invading foe, enter upon the execution of all the various movements and desultory finesse, which advancing and retreating bodies completely versant and experienced in the difficult and enterprising spirit of *petite guerre*, may be supposed to practise.—With what flaming enthusiasm may we not read of innumerable feats of gallantry achieved in these daring encounters, which would have graced the most gasconading period of republican chivalry.—Here a desperate line of pretended pikes or bristling bayonets intrepidly braved or forced; there a tremendous volley of blank cartridges given or received with the most cool and undaunted fortitude. On every side the admirable skill and magnanimity displayed, by their respective commandants and leaders; the handsome and patriotic addresses of thanks from some noble and judicious spectator, expressive of the astonishment with which they have so proudly witnessed the almost incredible performance of these incomparable corps, flash upon our optics.—We are next presented with some warm congratulation and complimentary eulogiums on government, for the paternal interest it has taken, both in the wise institution and admirable organization of this inimitable system of defence; the consecrated and immortal palladium of our laws, our liberty and constitution! The whole of this dramatic divertissement, in general, concluding with a sumptuous and constitutional dinner, attended with copious libations, in which we here devoutly

pledged by these gallant warriors, in the warmth of their convivial zeal, immortal glory to Old England; whilst, at the same time, the impious Corsican and his invading myrmidons are solemnly devoted to destruction, should he profanely dare to tread the hallowed sod of hereditary freedom.—It is time, however, that this pageant mockery of playing at soldiers should cease solely to occupy men's minds: sufficient time has been given for the fascinations of novelty; and the regular army, which has lain so long in the back ground, should claim some attention from the public.—Those who are accustomed to read, in the fungous productions of the daily newspapers, these incessant repetitions of volunteer mummery, would almost be persuaded to believe, that the corps of volunteers constitute the only military defence in the kingdom, and that such a thing as the existence of a regular army in the country, was the mere fanciful and illusory vision of a waking dream. Let us then, for a moment, attempt to undeceive the public: the present conjuncture of affairs so critically and dangerously important every hour to the nation, imperiously calls its most serious attention to the actual condition of our regular forces, but more especially to that of the *cavalry*.—The many distinguished and important services which the British cavalry have rendered to their country, both on our continental expeditions, and on every other occasion, should sufficiently have instructed us how to appreciate the value and inestimable advantages which our safety must essentially derive, at this moment, from having a numerous and well appointed body of them ready for immediate disposal.—Must not, then, the most superficial and uninformed observer, be justly struck with the utmost surprise and alarm, when he looks upon the present miserably reduced and defective scale of the war establishment of our cavalry forces?—And yet no country in Europe possesses more abundant and natural means for the raising and maintaining a numerous cavalry than the United Kingdom of the British Islands; whether we consider the national valour, the activity, constitutional vigour, and intelligence of the men, the velocity, strength, figure and docility of the horses; and yet there is no country in the world which can appoint its cavalry in that superior excellence of style in which the British regiments *might* be, were the liberal allowances granted to the colonels of regiments for this purpose, justly appropriated, and adequately expended on that branch of service.—This however, shall merit a future investigation.—The impolitic, nay, absurd

measure of reducing the cavalry on the late unfortunate suspension of hostilities, (for a peace it never could with propriety be denominated) is one of those splendid and immemorable proofs (amongst a thousand others,) which our present enlightened and heaven-born administration has given of its transcendent talents, of its infallible and consummate wisdom: but, then this was to be considered a very important branch of the economical regimen to be adopted in the pacifice code; and which has been pursued with such singular and incalculable advantages to the public.—On the resumption, however, of the present struggle, an augmentation of the regular forces fortunately occurred to, and was sagaciously determined upon by government; but how were the proposed numbers required to complete these augmentations to be raised? Were any probable means whatever adopted by which this could be accomplished?—Circular orders for recruiting were indeed issued; but, unless the mere announcing of his Majesty's pleasure for this purpose, together with the annexed signature of the Secretary at War, possessed the extraordinary and supernatural powers of Pompey's foot, (who boasted he could conjure up with it in a moment, by stamping on the ground, a legion of heroes) I know not by what other means, which were adopted, the army could be recruited! For by a quixotical combination of the most singular inconsistencies, government appears to have adopted one of the best concerted and effectual measures imaginable, completely to annihilate, in the same breath, that very recruiting service, the interests of which it affected to have so warmly and paternally at heart. Did not the embodying of the militia, and the formation of its supplementary; were not the battalions of reserve, and the renovation of volunteer associations; were not all these wise and admirable expedients for the defence of the country most consistently adopted at the same time? In order to obtain a sufficient number of men for the regulated quotas, what liberal, nay, extravagant bounties were not offered for substitutes? Bounties from 25 to 50 guineas! And even notwithstanding this, the militia and reserve battalions are, at this moment, not above two thirds completed; so completely exhausted is the country of that part of its population which is in any degree fit for military services, (admitting the legislative exemption of these tumultuary hordes of non-descripts, cycled volunteers).—I might here, by a short digression, not only point out the dangerous inutility of these rank productions of the ministerial hot-bed, but likewise, the ir-

repara-
regula-
ly eva-
without
have b-
service
but, a-
dicio-
cal Re-
further-
most
servat-
caval-
tempt-
lowed
regim-
large
filling
serve-
ment
the li-
porta-
be su-
thing
of na-
other
mina-
as we-
of th-
ward-
suffe-
tion
been
gigan-
the e-
order
for i-
selfis-
resor-
capti-
viou-
lieut-
ceed-
to th-
resp-
cien-
and
cru-
tisfi-
ly a-
out
spec-
full
bers
wer-
pain-
wit-
only

reparable injury which they have done to the regular service, by the shameful and dastardly evasion of performing those duties, which, without the law of exemption, they would have been compelled to, either by personal services, or at least by virtue of substitutes: but, as this subject has been so ably and judiciously treated by the Editor of the *Political Register*, I shall, at present, decline any further comments upon them than what must necessarily occur in prosecuting my observations relative to the recruiting of the cavalry.—When we compare the contemptibly small and penurious bounties allowed by government in order to recruit the regiments of the line, with the enormously large and unprecedented bounties given for filling up the militia and battalions of reserve, it would almost appear that government, either considered the augmentation of the line as comparatively trifling and unimportant, and that their services could not be sufficiently confided in; and that every thing should yield to their favourite system of national defence, the volunteers, &c.: or, otherwise, they have betrayed the most criminal neglect in the proper application of, as well as the most unpardonable ignorance of the resources of the country: or would upwards of six months have been indolently suffered to elapse befor the first augmentation of the regular troops has even partially been completed? Notwithstanding, the most gigantic and formidable preparations which the enemy has incessantly been making in order to accelerate and mature his plans for invading our coasts. The failure of that selfish expedient of government which was resorted to, on the appointment of effective captains to those troops which were previously held by field officers, requiring those lieutenants* and cornets who were to succeed to the vacancies by promotion, to produce a stipulated quota of men in proportion to the degree of rank to which they were respectively to succeed, might have sufficiently convinced them how perfectly idle and unproductive is the present mode of recruiting the cavalry.—I am perfectly satisfied that every means were most strenuously adopted by those officers who were sent out on that occasion to recruit for their respective ranks, and that in addition to the full bounty allowed by government, very liberal sums from their own private purses were expended, and the most indefatigable pains used to raise their stipulated quotas within the prescribed period.—Notwith-

standing all these means, however, it was found absolutely impracticable to accomplish their object. The ultimate view was abandoned, and the promotions took place, because government could no longer conceal the fear of national reproach which they justly apprehended, in suffering field officers of nameless importance to retain the holding of troops, which (among a thousand other hoary headed abuses in the service) ought long ago to have been relinquished, and the places filled up by meritorious and efficient officers. But the timid and temporising system which Virginius has remarked to have a meridian ascendancy at the Horse-Guards and the War-Office, sufficiently accounts for the languid and procrastinating steps followed on this occasion, as well as in every thing else of the simplest utility, or of a regenerating tendency.—Before the first augmentation was in general completed, or that of the second partially begun, another order comes out for the formation of two additional troops to each regiment. This order is worded with extreme caution, but vaguely conditional, although the tenor of it appears essentially to correspond with that issued for the recruiting men for the effective captaincies; and, it is evident, must be attended with equal success. Five weeks scarcely remain to complete the required numbers, and yet it may be confidently affirmed, that scarce twenty men per regiment at an average have hitherto been raised towards effecting this; notwithstanding the unremitting exertions of the officers, and numerous recruiting parties sent out for this purpose. As it is perfectly evident that half the number of men required for the stipulated aggregate of 160 cannot be raised; is it to be expected that the augmentation of two additional troops will take place? And that those officers at present employed to raise men for this purpose will succeed to their appointments, in the same manner as those officers who recruited for the effective captaincies succeeded, notwithstanding they failed in raising their stipulated quotas? It need not here be stated, should the augmentation not take place, and those officers now recruiting not succeed to their appointments, what serious injury and pecuniary loss they must inevitably sustain in consequence of the large sums which they have industriously expended in their endeavours to procure men, over and above the full bounties allowed by government? As there is no provision whatever made for the reimbursement to officers of those high extra-contingent expenses, they must necessarily incur on this service, when they have such complicated difficulties to en-

* It will be understood that the cavalry is here only considered.

counter, and to oppose their success.—It shall now be attempted to explain the imperious necessity of an effective augmentation of the cavalry immediately taking place, and to point out the only remaining resources in the country by which this can possibly be accomplished.—That the present low establishment of the cavalry may be attributed to a misaken and ill-founded opinion of government, with regard to the very limited utility of their operations in a country like this so intersected and enclosed, may be safely affirmed.—A more dangerous idea likewise, generally prevails, that the invading enemy will confide entirely to their infantry for success; as they neither are possessed of, or can employ means to transport their cavalry. But let us for a moment examine these two important considerations.—With regard to the very limited use of which cavalry can be in an enclosed and intersected country like this, it must certainly be admitted, that their operations in line can seldom be employed to such effectual advantage, as might be expected in a free open campaign country, uninterrupted with hedges and other agricultural fences, which chagrin and diversity rich cultivated plains; but as experience sufficiently demonstrates, that the essential use of cavalry is not merely confined to situations where they can act in line, but that equally important services are more frequently derived from them in detached bodies, on which kind of services during the course of the most active campaign, the most signal advantages have been gained from them; it is from such operations in separate and detached bodies, that we may anticipate the most fortunate employment of them on the event of being called out against the invading enemy. Independent of cavalry indispensably forming the advanced and rear guards of columns, furnishing the advanced posts and patroles of communication, and their being constantly employed in scouring and reconnoitring the country, without considering the important duties of escorting foraging parties, covering the artillery, and furnishing guards for the ammunition, for the waggons of the commissary department, and the general baggage of the army; in all of which occasions they are constantly employed on active service; a number of others equally momentous might be enumerated, the care and execution of all which is consigned to the cavalry; and without the necessary aid and co-operation of which, an army of infantry, even supported by the finest artillery in the world, according to the principles of modern warfare, would soon be annihilated.—Was it consistent with the cir-

cupscribed limits of this paper, I might here mention the formidable and dangerous demonstrations which a few squadrons only of horse can make, when hanging upon and threatening the flanks of a line of infantry, unsupported by cavalry. How peculiarly galling and harassing they are to columns of a march, by their intrepid ardour and indefatigable activity, attacking and intercepting the enemy's convoy, destroying and cutting off their chain of communication, &c. all of which indispensable services could not possibly be accomplished, without a well mounted and numerous cavalry. But we are only hitherto considering their use in a partial view. However highly their services must be estimated in detached bodies, they can likewise, in this country, be employed upon all those grand operations, of which extensive lines are susceptible. We are not to confine our ideas merely to the narrow limits of the marshy interrupted coasts of Essex or Suffolk, when an assailable chain of several hundred miles in extent presents itself to a bold and enterprising enemy. Could not our gallant cavalry act with the most combined advantage on the downs of Sussex or Dorset? And should the enemy successfully penetrate into the country upon the eastern coast, where could there be a finer place for cavalry to act than on that grand theatre of our equestrian amusement, Newmarket, and its vicinity for several miles round? And should they attempt to invade our coasts, unsupported by cavalry, would it not be a most prudent and eligible measure to let them penetrate thus far into the interior, and, by a judicious manœuvre, insensibly cause them to concentrate their strength near such a place, where our cavalry, by its irresistible and overwhelming impetus, in one decisive battle could annihilate the whole invading host.—That the enemy, however, could ever entertain the idea of making a serious and effectual impression on this country, in their system of attack, without the powerful and indispensable aid of cavalry, is by no means either probable or consistent with a well concerted plan of operations. An advancing army, whose constant and determined object is attack and conquest, without very peculiar exceptions indeed, never can act decisively without the sovereign aid of cavalry. And this has been laid down as an axiom by the most able and experienced generals.—We have, however, the most indubitable proofs that a very powerful force of cavalry are destined by the enemy for this expedition, and are at this moment assembled upon the coast, in order to co-operate with their infantry; a force too, which, in point of numbers, will

present the regu
at this t
of attack
are not
those fo
and vig
nitude c
taken, i
on our
point o
rence v
cavalry
which n
lar.y ad
establish
ber of b
force, c
West In
battalion
tillery f
amount
which c
ments, e
fective.
doms co
pleted t
upward
these, v
omitting
total of
number
produce
ment, a
Those i
drons, i
furnish
battalion
portion
From th
made a
ments o
we find
former v
of one-
ought to
ficient
powers
incompa
ses, i
the wh
late to
branch
augmen
to make
have be
sice, of
cavalry,
manry) a
about 3
gument

present a very formidable opposition to all the regular cavalry which we could assemble at this moment, either at one or more places of attack. The means of transporting them are not more impracticably difficult than those for the infantry; as, equally cautious and vigilant measures adequate to the magnitude of their importance, will certainly be taken, in order to effect their disembarkation on our shores. I come now, succinctly, to point out the very disproportionate difference which at present exists between our cavalry and infantry force; a difference which most imperiously requires to be regularly adjusted, and the proportion relatively established. — In examining the total number of battalions which compose our infantry force, comprehending foot guards, line, and West India regiments, garrison battalions and battalions of reserve, not including the artillery foreign corps now raising, we find the amount to be 172 battalions, were all of which completed to their present establishments, would make an army of 149,000 effective. The militia of the United Kingdoms compose 130 battalions, which, if completed to their establishment, would produce upwards of 112,000 effective: the whole of these, viz. infantry of the line and militia, omitting the odd hundreds, compose a grand total of 261,000 effective men. The total number of our cavalry regiments is 34, which produces, according to the present establishment, a total of only 24,798 effective men. Those regiments which compose 136 squadrons, if properly distributed, would not furnish the proportion of one squadron to two battalions, which is a most glaring disproportion for any kind of efficient service. From the above calculations, which are only made according to the respective establishments of cavalry regiments and battalions; we find the present existing proportion of the former with the latter, to be the immense one of one-fifth in place of one third, which ought to be at least the proportion of an efficient force of cavalry. The continental powers have been of late so sensible of the incomparable advantages which an army possesses, in having a numerous cavalry, that the whole of their attention appears of late to be solely directed to this important branch of service; as witness the immense augmentation which the Prussians are about to make to their cavalry. By returns which have been lately delivered into the War-Office, of the effective number of volunteer cavalry, (which I presume includes the yeomanry) the statement is laid down to be about 31,000. And hence, probably, an argument may be deduced, that these will

form a most important accession of strength to our cavalry, and effectually preclude the necessity of further increasing the establishment of such an expensive branch of our regular forces. This accession must certainly appear, upon paper, to be great, and adequate for every purpose; but what field services are we to expect from this aggregate body of volunteer and yeomanry troops on the event of their being called out? Have they ever been brigaded to act in concert? Are they capable of performing together those necessary evolutions, the combined relative movements, and various changes of position which are required in lines? The respectability of their military appearance, and their unquestionable zeal to be useful, will little avail them in the face of an experienced and desperate enemy. Their horses which have never been accustomed to, or even heard the fire of a line of infantry; the natural confusion which must attend such raw and inexperienced horsemen, together with the want of proper leaders to conduct them amidst the dangerous and complicated movements necessary to be performed amidst the tremendous fire of artillery and small arms; if under all these unfortunate disadvantages they should be left to themselves, they must inevitably be lost; or should they act in concert with the regular cavalry, it is impossible to foresee what dangerous an effect their confusion must produce upon the latter; that universal rout and irretrievable defeat might ensue to the whole. Those only who have seen real service can truly imagine the indescribable effect which the contagion of panic, the natural concomitant of confusion, produces oftentimes in the bravest and most veteran troops, and which experience shews has occasioned the loss of many important battles. The cause of this, in general, originating from the confusion and trepidation of raw unpractised troops, when mixed with others in line. — I need not mention their total unfitness to act in detached bodies near the enemy, as none but veteran troops, perfectly acquainted with mounted field duties, can possibly be employed on such service to any advantage; a kind of service which would require the most active and experienced of our finest light troops. — The gallant and meritorious services which the Irish yeomanry performed during the late unfortunate commotion in that country, decidedly point out the proper sphere of employment and action for their brethren here. To preserve internal tranquillity and civil order in the country, whilst the regular troops are drawn out upon the coast; holds out to them a very extensive and responsible

line of duty, for which they are most peculiarly adapted; and to perform which effectually, their numbers are barely adequate. To be the safeguards of public as well as individual property, to keep up the necessary communication of the interior with the armies on the coast, to protect, to conduct and expedite every kind of necessary supplies, to convey dispatches, and maintain the necessary relations of every kind between the army and the country; such various and important services will be a sufficient field to them for a display of their most active exertions and patriotic zeal. — Having considered the indispensable necessity of an immediate augmentation of the cavalry taking place; I shall now recur to the only remaining resources in the country, by means of which this can possibly be accomplished. — As it appears sufficiently obvious that the above mentioned augmentation of the cavalry cannot possibly succeed, according to the present established mode of the recruiting service, the whole system of which, at this moment, militates so strongly against the cavalry, in consequence of the inspecting field officers of districts, by the most shamefully partial and unwarrantable privilege they give to the infantry of the line over that of the cavalry, in passing of them by intermediate approval; by means of which numbers of recruits fit for the cavalry are rejected by them. In order that the infantry may reap the advantage, upon the most frivolous and vexatious pretences, every obstacle is studiously thrown in the way of cavalry officers, in order to oppose their success, and to gratify their own partiality to the *infantry*, from which the whole of these inspecting field-officers without scarce an exception have been appointed. I need not hesitate to affirm, that unless some adequate and decisive steps are immediately taken by the Commander in Chief to put a stop to this shameful and hurtful conduct of these field-officers, that the recruiting of the cavalry will be entirely annihilated. This flagrant and growing irregularity might easily be remedied, by appointing a proportionate number of those inspecting field-officers from the cavalry, by means of which, a proper counterpoise to the undue influence of the infantry would be established, and the regulation for the general recruiting service put into impartial execution, and implicitly adhered to — — In consequence, therefore, of the inseparable obstacles, which at present oppose every prospect of success, from the present mode of recruiting the cavalry, it will be found, from conclusive reference, that no alternative whatever remains, for effecting their augmentation.

tion, but a government order of permission for the voluntary enlistment of soldiers from the army of reserve or militia. I do not mean that a bounty should be indiscriminately offered to every man who might be inclined to transfer his services to the cavalry, but that a certain number of young, active, and robust men, constitutionally fit for all the variety of laborious duties required of dragoons should be selected from each battalion. For this purpose two experienced general officers might be appointed to form them into two classes, one for the heavy, the other for the light cavalry; as however, the most extended services of light regiments will be most particularly wanted at this crisis, a decided preference should, at the same time, be given to the latter, in order to have its numbers completed first. Should the full bounty alone, which is allowed by government in the regular recruiting service be offered to these battalions for this purpose, I need not hesitate to affirm, that more than two thirds would volunteer their services into the cavalry, such a general fondness and emulation British soldiers entertain to serve in the horse; and on such a pressing exigency as the present, it would be highly impolitic in government not to encourage this generous and honourable predilection they entertain for the cavalry. As the complete formation of a dragoon naturally presupposes his having been instructed in all the dismounted duties, in common with those of the infantry soldiers, previous to his having been instructed in the manage, and being taught the mounted duties; it must be a most important consideration to have the augmentation filled up with such men as are already formed on foot; and as their services might, in a very short period, be required, a very inconsiderable space of time would be requisite under the auspices of regular discipline, to render them sufficiently acquainted and expert in the mounted exercises. It might here be adduced as an argument against the mode of raising men for the augmentation, that a sufficient number of horses could not be procured to mount the recruits within the necessary period, this may be partially true; but was government to undertake, of itself, the purchase of all the remount horses for regiments of cavalry; instead of this important affair being consigned, as it generally is, to colonels, or commanding officers of regiments, very considerable advantages would accrue to the public. Horses of a very superior kind to those which are at present purchased would be procured, and the number wanted procured within a shorter period of time. Even at

this moment
vernment
different c
sioned of
them, and
dépôts es
they could
previous to
respective
appointed
neficial c
sity of re
lion of re
me, a cit
Command
men of th
clined, to
tillery, for
period, b
for putti
and limit
very sing
valry, w
which th
tended, c
can only
gular rea
ters who
confidence
infantry
are either
and utilit
persuasion
Highness
lated for
nation,
serving t
It is to b
guards w
extended
rected a
rested m
so munit
the mili
such an
more the
Cressy a
pire once
nience an
seat of t
and of a
Suffolk,

this moment were agents employed by government, for the purchase of horses in the different districts, and a judicious commissioned officer appointed in each to pass them, and afterwards conducted to certain dépôts established for that purpose, where they could be instantly formed for the ranks, previous to their being finally sent to their respective regiments to which they might be appointed, would be a most eligible and beneficial circumstance.—Since the necessity of recruiting the cavalry from the battalion of reserve and militia first occurred to me, a circular order has been issued by the Commander in Chief for permission to such men of the battalions of reserve as were inclined, to extend their services to the artillery, foot guards, and line, to an unlimited period, by voluntary enlistment; the period for putting this in execution is prescribed and limited very short; it appears, however, very singular, that on this occasion, the cavalry, who ought to have been the first to which this permission should have been extended, should be peculiarly excluded; and can only be accounted for by this very singular reason, that all those military characters who are officially attendant or in the confidence of the Commander in Chief, infantry officers from the guards, who are either not acquainted with the nature and utility of cavalry, or must, from a strange persuasion of sentiment, have induced H. R. Highness to sacrifice that which is calculated for the general good and safety of the nation, to personal accommodations and serving the private interests of friends.—It is to be hoped, however, that the horse-guards will begin to take more liberal and extended views into the service, solely directed and compelled by pure and disinterested motives to serve that country, which so munificently rewards every department of the military: from the commencement of such an æra, we may fondly anticipate once more the renovation of the laureled fields of Cressy and Agincourt; and the British empire once more proudly assert her pre-eminence among the nations, as not only the seat of the sciences, but the nurse of heroes and of arms.

MARCELLUS.

Suffolk, 20th Nov. 1803.

ROWLAND HILL, MR. SHERIDAN, THE VOLUNTEERS AND THE HOTTENTOTS.

SIR,—As an incorrect statement of what took place at the Rev. Rowland Hill's Chapel on Sunday last, has crept into most of the daily papers, I rely upon your candour for an insertion of the following account in

your valuable Weekly Register.—In consequence of its being announced by public advertisement, that the Reverend Gentleman intended to preach a sermon to the Volunteers, a great concourse of people assembled at the Chapel. A continued line of Volunteers was making for the Chapel over Blackfriars Bridge, and in all directions leading to the Chapel, from about half past one o'clock till past three.—Every precaution was adopted to keep order; the door nearest to Blackfriars Bridge was opened at two o'clock, for the reception of the Volunteers only to the gallery; those who were admitted to the principal seats, or those inclosed round the pulpit, were admitted through the area of Mr. Hill's house, where constables attended to keep order.—By three o'clock the gallery was completely filled, and it was one of the grandest military spectacles ever beheld. Near two thousand were supposed to be there; and the Chapel being of an octagon form, every man was to be seen at one view.—The center door was then opened for the reception of spectators to those seats which are allotted to persons who attend the Chapel, free of expense. The pressure to gain admittance exceeds all description. The screams of the women were heard for a considerable distance.—A seat was fitted up for Mr. Sheridan in the gallery, on the right hand side of the pulpit. He was conducted to it by the Rev. Mr. Jay, the Evening Lecturer, and the venerable Mrs. Martha Wigmore, who has been pew-opener to the Chapel for three and thirty years, and is upwards of three score and ten. Mr. Sheridan was dressed in the uniform of the St. James's Volunteers. He looked remarkably well, and was in the highest spirits.—The Hottentots, lately brought to England by the Missionaries, had been invited upon the occasion, and were seated in the reading desk to the left of the pulpit.—The service commenced by singing the 100th Psalm. The curate then read a chapter out of Deuteronomy and Ephesians. The Volunteers, after that, sung a hymn to the tune “God save the King!” Mr. Hill then went to prayer; and another hymn was afterwards sung. Mr. Hill then took his text from the 20th Psalm, and 7th and 8th verses.—The Rev. Gentleman commenced his discourse with a very excellent and appropriate panegyric on the patriotic conduct of the Volunteers, in gallantly standing forward in the defence of their country. Under the second head, he spoke in very high terms of the excellence of the government of this country, and then compared this government with that of France. He concluded with obser-

vations on his text, as applicable to the present times: told the Volunteers of the goodness of their cause, and desired them to trust to God for success.—After the sermon, a hymn was sung to the tune of "Rule Britannia!" the words were by Mr. Hill; they are a parody on those of that admirable song beginning thus:

" When Jesus first at Heaven's command."

The hymn was sung by about five thousand persons, assembled in the Chapel, accompanied by a very powerful organ, which had a surprising and grand effect.—Mr. Sheridan was observed to join in the chorus with peculiar fervency.—

—The heat was so excessive, that several of the Volunteers were obliged to retire from indisposition. An alarm was raised on one of the staircases, that the gallery was falling, when numbers ran out, and had this reached the inside of the chapel the most serious consequences must have ensued.—

Several thousand Volunteers, as well as others, remained on the outside of the chapel during the whole time of divine service.—

—After the service was over, Mr. Sheridan was conducted to the vestry room, where, together with the Reverend Preacher and the Hottentots, he partook of some refreshments, and continued for some time in close conversation with those interesting strangers. He explained to them, by their interpreter, the nature of the Volunteer system, which met with their cordial approbation. He afterwards put to them some close questions as to their religious experiences, which they answered in a manner much to his satisfaction.—So great was the anxiety of the relations of the Volunteers, to behold the Honourable Senator who had so generously stepped forward to move the thanks of the House of Commons in their behalf, that several thousands remained in the Surrey Road for more than two hours after the chapel was closed; and Mr. Sheridan, understanding that it was their intention to chair him, was at last obliged to borrow the wig and cassock of the Reverend Preacher, by which means he made his way through the populace, without being discovered.—

—I remain, Sir, your humble Servant,

JOHN SMITH.

Union Street, Dec. 7, 1803.

TO THE PUBLIC.

The correspondence between his Majesty, his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, his Royal Highness the Duke of York, and the

Chancellor of the Exchequer, having appeared in the other public prints, some surprise may, perhaps, be excited at its not appearing in the Political Register; but, when reflection shall have taken place of curiosity, I trust, that there will be found but very few of my Readers, who will disapprove of the omission. A correspondence between *the Prince and the Minister* I should have thought myself at full liberty to publish, and also to comment on; but, from publishing the letters, which are here alluded to, I am withheld by all the notions which I entertain of the Royal character, and by all the principles which have hitherto been the guide of my public conduct. There may, however, be some persons, who will be disappointed at not seeing the correspondence in the Political Register, and who will, perhaps, deny, that, after its appearance in every other periodical work, it ought to be excluded from mine. If this opinion should operate to the prejudice of my labours in general, I shall be sorry; if it should injure the cause which I have espoused, I shall still more sorely lament; but, neither this consideration, nor any other, shall induce me, either now or at any future period, to be instrumental in communicating to the world, or in putting upon record, the documents in question; and my further resolution is, never to make, or to admit into my work, any comment on them, or allusion to them; a resolution which has been dictated by that profound respect and veneration which I entertain towards all the Royal Persons concerned, and particularly towards my Sovereign, to whom I am bound by the ties of affection, gratitude, and allegiance, and whose sacred office and person God has commanded me to honour.

NOTIFICATIONS.

Several articles, intended for insertion this week, are unavoidably postponed, till next. Amongst others the article respecting the OXFORD Volunteers, which was omitted last week owing to a mistake arising from the mode of conveyance.

The Analytical and Comparative View of the Pamphlets relative to Messrs. Addington and Pitt was too long to be inscribed entire in this sheet. That article, therefore, together with some remarks on the conduct of ministers with regard to Ireland, and on the accounts lately presented to parliament, will appear in a double sheet next week.

The second No. of Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates is published this day, and is sold by all those persons who sell the Register—Gentlemen who wish to have this work sent to the country, are respectfully reminded, that it has *no stamp*, and cannot be sent *post free*; and that it must be obtained in the way as Magazines and Reviews are.